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In another revelation, a Gupta-owned company, Estina, was paid R84 million and granted a feefree lease of thousands of hectares of land near Vrede in the Free State. The deal was ostensibly intended to drive agricultural empowerment projects for residents, but instead the money appears to have landed up in the United Arab Emirates, from where it was funnelled back to South Africa through and into other Gupta-owned companies. 2 The deal was facilitated by current Minister of Mineral Resources Mosebenzi Zwane, who at the time was the Free State MEC for agriculture.
Separately, but as suspiciously, Zwane launched a new mining charter in June this year, calling for rapid 'empowerment' in the sector. While few would dispute the need for South Africa's mining sector and economy at large to transform, Zwane's brash move resulted in the loss of R50 billion in JSE-listed mining stocks (a matter touched on in Mbekezeli Mzhize's article in this issue), possibly in part due to his questionable character and motivations in light of the #GuptaLeaks. 3 
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Both revelations -the locomotive and agricultural deals -hint at the degree to which business people and politicians, many linked to Gupta and Zuma networks, have colluded to fleece the South African fiscus in recent years. What's more, the emails confirm suspicions that the Guptas'
Oakbay Capital employed British public relations firm Bell Pottinger to craft strategies to defend the Zuma and Gupta families and their allies from mounting accusations of state capture. 4 Beginning in early 2016, Bell Pottinger staff wrote speeches and prepared talking points for Gupta and Zuma allies, which were in turn spread by Gupta-owned media outlets and Twitter bots in an enormously powerful 'fake news' operation. 5 The firm charged over R1.5 million a month as a retainer for its divisive services.
In early September, following a formal complaint by the Democratic Alliance, Bell Pottinger was 
This issue
It is hard, considering the consolidation of political and economic power revealed in the #GuptaLeaks, to imagine how South Africa's criminal justice system will stem the looting of the state.
But what about commercial crime on a more modest scale? In the first article in this issue, Trevor
Budhram and Nicolaas Geldenhuys use SAPS performance data to suggest that the SAPS is losing the battle against even relatively minor commercial crime. With a focus on detection rates, they convincingly argue that the SAPS performance is unjustifiably weak, and that this weakness is hidden behind the inclusion of unfounded and withdrawn cases, and the classification of whole dockets (which can include multiple charges) as single charges in its accounting systems. They suggest that this makes the SAPS look more efficient than it is, obscuring its inability to address commercial crime. In so doing, they add to a growing body of literature highlighting the pitfalls of performance targets in policing.
Next, John Kole asks whether private security officers (PSOs) could better support the SAPS crime prevention mandate if they had more legal authority. To explore this question, Kole presents data from interviews and a survey carried out with senior private security and SAPS managers, as well as with operational officers. Current legislation limits PSOs from acting beyond their capacity as private citizens. To many it is obvious that more armed, uniformed men and women with the authority to stop, search and detain suspected law-breakers will reduce crime. However, Kole questions whether more police would mean less crime. Evidence from elsewhere in the world suggests that it would not. 6 Furthermore, the proposal that PSOs be given more authority is not supported by the police or
5
SA CRIME QUARTERLY NO. 61 • SEPTEMBER 2017 private security managers he interviewed. Even if they did, do we really want to coerce and punish ourselves towards a more just South Africa? Our sentencing policies suggest that we do.
South Africa has harsh minimum sentences, supported by the logic that serious crime deserves serious punishment. 7 report from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University found that imprisonment in the US has had almost no effect on crime rates since the early 1990s. 9 This is because once prison populations reach a certain level, imprisonment has diminishing crime deterrence returns. Surely I hope that you enjoy the issue. 
A final word
